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Abstract
We use Structural Vector Autoregressions to study the impact of technology improvements
on hours worked in the major seven countries. While previous studies estimate the response of
labor input to permanent shocks to country–level labor productivity, we consider the response
of labor input to aggregate–level labor productivity. Since labor productivities do cointegrate
in the G7, the estimated responses should look very similar. They do not: for each country but
Germany, the responses estimated using G7 labor productivity sizeably exceed those estimated
using country–level labor productivity. These results also hold in larger SVAR models.
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Introduction
This paper uses Structural Vector Autoregressions (SVAR) to assess the short run effects of
technology shocks on hours worked in the major seven countries. It provides a contribution
to the lively debate about the effect of productivity improvements on labor input in an open
economy setup.
The challenging task in measuring the effects on inputs (including labor) of technology
shocks is to measure technology itself. The conceptual object with which macroeconomists
describe technology is the aggregate production function, the empirical counterpart of which is
not observable. Under constant returns to scale, permanent labor-augmenting improvements
in technology can however be identified. Because Harrod–neutral permanent technology shocks
do not eventually affect the optimal mix of inputs, the long–run movements in average labor
productivity, which are observable, reveal those of technology. Gal´ı [1999], Gal´ı and Rabanal
[2004] and Francis and Ramey [2005] endorse this identifying scheme to measure the effects of
permanent shocks to productivity with a Structural Vectorial Auto-Regressive (SVAR) model,
using a long–run restriction a` la Blanchard and Quah [1989]. These studies conclude that
such technology shocks drive labor input down during several quarters in most industrialized
countries. This finding contradicts standard flexible–price models, but favours sticky–price
models in which output is demand–determined in the short–run.1
In this paper, we argue that the international transmission of shocks first prevents the
SVAR used in the existing literature to accurately identify permanent shocks to technology,
but, second, provides alternative identifying restrictions.
Our first claim is that evaluations carried over using SVAR on country–level data are not
informative. Using annual growth rates of labor productivity and per capita hours worked
for the period 1972–2004, we show that the sign of the measured short–run response of hours
worked to permanent technology shocks depends on the aggregation level. Precisely, the fol-
lowing three observations are inconsistent with each other: i) SVAR evaluations carried out
with single–country data suggest that hours worked do not increase in any of the seven G7
countries.2 ii) an evaluation with G7 aggregate data (i.e. total G7 hours worked and average
productivity of labor) reveals a sizeable increase in G7 hours worked. iii) labor productivi-
ties of the major seven country cointegrate, meaning that the permanent technology shock is
1Accepting this interpretation, Collard and Dellas [2007] and Francis and Ramey [2005], among others, specify
flexible–price models able to reproduce a fall in hours following a technology shock.
2Our results are similar to those obtained by Gal´ı [2005].
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common to the G7 countries.3 Since hours worked do not increase in any G7 country after a
common permanent shock, it should therefore not do so at the G7 level. If the SVAR properly
uncovered the responses to a permanent productivity shocks, we would obtain the same results
with country–level and aggregate–level data. We label the discrepancy between the response of
hours worked evaluated at the country and G7 level an aggregation puzzle. We interpret this
puzzle as a consequence of identification errors at the country level which disappear once data
are aggregated.
Our results are related to those in Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan [2008], Erceg, Guerri-
eri and Gust [2005] and Dupaigne, Fe`ve and Matheron [2007]. These papers show through
closed–economy structural models that preference and fiscal shocks disturb the identification
of permanent technology shocks. Their common intuition is that, under decreasing returns to
labor input, every shock with long–lasting detrimental effects on labor input stimulates average
labor productivity, even in the medium–run. Such shocks contaminate the estimated response
of labor input to permanent productivity shocks. Quantitatively, such distortions appear to
be large enough to reverse the sign of the employment response for DGPs mimicking different
statistics of US data. We extend these analysis to a multi-country setup.
In an international context, foreign non-permanent shocks also induce the contamination
of permanent technology shocks. To see this, let us consider a simple two–country model
a` la Baxter and Crucini [1993] with a world permanent shock and country–specific stationary
shocks.4 A shock that temporarily increases the productivity of the domestic country shifts down
the labor input in the foreign country, because the positive wealth effect (due to asset portfolio
diversification) leads households to reduce their labor supply. The drop in hours worked raises
productivity in those countries as long as capital is not fully reallocated to the most productive
economy. Hence, the average productivity of labor in any country does not only reflect its own
shocks, but also those of its neighbors. SVARs models cannot therefore accurately identify
permanent technology shocks from country–level data because of the international transmission
of shocks.
3A large number of papers, including Stock and Watson [2005], Canova, Ciccarelli and Ortega [2007] and Kose,
Otrok and Whiteman [2008], establish the large contribution of world shocks to aggregate fluctuations. Moreover,
Rabanal, Rubio-Ramı´rez and Tuesta [2008] have shown that Total Factor Productivity (TFP) cointegrates among
major industrialized countries and thus favored the relevance of a world permanent technology shocks.
4In Dupaigne and Fe`ve [2009], we estimate and simulate a two–country DSGE model with a permanent world
technology shock and stationary country–specific technology and preference shocks. We obtain that country–level
SVAR models lead to biased estimation of the true permanent technology shock. We also show that an aggregate
measure of labor productivity reduces the bias when it is used instead of domestic ones in SVARs with long run
restriction. See also Collard and Dellas [2007] for an open economy setup about the effect of permanent technology
shocks on employment.
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In a second step, we consider a novel specification of the SVAR model which accounts for
open economy mechanisms. We replace country–level labor productivity (the variable sup-
porting the identifying restriction) by a variable which is as little contaminated as possible by
persistent shocks. The measure of productivity we use is the average G7 labor productivity,
which aggregates each domestic labor productivity of the seven countries. Aggregation poten-
tially offsets the country–level stationary shocks which contaminate country–level data. Indeed,
when we use the G7 labor productivity instead of country–level labor productivities, almost no
discrepancy between the responses of hours evaluated at the country and G7 level remains. Our
findings also hold in larger SVAR models.5
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the identification of permanent tech-
nology shocks using SVARs. In section 2, we discuss the short–run effects of these shocks on
hours worked using country level data. Section 3 reports the empirical findings when we mix
aggregate and country–level data. Section 4 documents the robustness of our empirical findings
and the last section concludes.
1 Identification of permanent technology shocks
To identify technology shocks and their effects, Gal´ı [1999] estimates a canonical vectorial auto-
regressive (VAR) model over the growth rates of labor productivity, ∆xt, and labor input, ∆ht
(omitting the constant term without loss of generality):[
∆xt
∆ht
]
= A1
[
∆xt−1
∆ht−1
]
+ . . .+Ap
[
∆xt−p
∆ht−p
]
+ ut. (1)
The error term ut in this expression is not serially correlated and has a variance–covariance
matrix Ω.
When this VAR is invertible, the growth rates of labor productivity and labor input can be
expressed as a moving average (the order of which is possibly infinite) of the innovations u:[
∆xt
∆ht
]
= ut +B1 ut−1 +B2 ut−2 + . . . .
In this setup, Bk measures the kth period response of the endogenous variables to a unit
disturbance. However, neither the disturbance u nor these responses Bk can receive any struc-
tural interpretation at this point, because this vectorial moving average (VMA) representation
is definitively not unique. In fact, any process
C0 vt +C1 vt−1 +C2 vt−2 + . . . ,with Evtv′t = Ψ.
5At the quarterly frequency, only employment data are available on this sample. Our results hold on quarterly
employment data (see Dupaigne and Fe`ve [2009]).
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yields the same vector of observables [∆x′t,∆h′t] as soon as
C0 vt = ut,
Cj C−10 = Bj ,
C0 ΨC′0 = Ω.
In a two–variables VAR, these conditions give three constraints while C0 has four elements.
Structural VARs use economic theory to impose the restrictions required to compute C0 and
to recover the structural shocks from the disturbance u.
The theoretical restriction used by Gal´ı [1999] and Francis and Ramey [2005] is that im-
provements in technology raise the average productivity of labor, and that labor productivity is
in the long–run only driven by such technology shocks. These properties arise in a large number
of macroeconomic models, even though not in all of them.6 The use of average labor produc-
tivity as a proxy for technology imposes long–run identification: in the short and medium run,
the stock of physical capital also affects the average productivity of labor given technology; but
shocks with permanent effects on labor productivity, i.e. after capital (and any potential other
input) has adjusted, are technological in nature.
Using the lag operator L, the growth rates of labor productivity and labor input are written
as distributed lags of two orthogonal shocks, {zt } and {mt } of identity variance–covariance
matrix: [
∆xt
∆ht
]
=
[
C11(L) C12(L)
C21(L) C22(L)
] [
zt
mt
]
. (2)
The identifying restriction C12(1) = 0 implies that the second shock, {mt }, does not have any
long run impact on productivity. Hence, the first shock, {zt }, is the only one having permanent
effects on labor productivity, and can be interpreted as a permanent technology shock.
We use this methodology to evaluate the impact response of hours worked to the permanent
technology shock in the major seven countries (United States, Canada, Japan, United Kingdom,
Germany, France and Italy). As emphasized by Gal´ı [2005], the choice between the different
measures of labor input available may have some consequences on the identification of permanent
technology shocks. We use hours worked rather than employment to ensure that (potential)
permanent shocks to hours per worker do not have long–run effects on our measure of labor
productivity. In the OECD countries, hours per worker are only available at annual frequency
for relatively long homogenous time series. We use annual data on labor productivity and hours
worked for the period 1972–2004 from the OECD National Accounts and Labor Force Statistics.
Hours worked are defined as the product of civilian employment and hours per employee. They
6Endogenous growth models are obvious examples of setups in which non–technology shocks (here, any shock) have
long–run effects on labor productivity. Alternatively, Uhlig [2004] emphasizes permanent changes in the capital tax
rate or changing attitude towards the workplace.
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are subsequently converted per capita using a measure of population over the age of 16. Labor
productivity is defined as the ratio of real output per capita to hours worked.
The specification of hours worked (levels vs first–differences) in the VAR models is an im-
portant and controversial empirical issue (see Gal´ı [1999], [2005] and Christiano, Eichenbaum
and Vigfusson [2004]). The results of ADF unit root tests are reported in Table 1 (in appendix).
They suggest that log hours are difference stationary and that the VAR model (1) underlying
the VMA representation (2) is stationary. The number of lags is set to two, according to usual
information criteria.
2 Empirical results from country level data
Model (1) is estimated for each of the major seven countries. Figure 1 displays the estimated
impact responses of hours worked to the permanent productivity shock. For each country,
it reports the empirical distribution of the population of impact responses (smoothed using
a Gaussian kernel), its median and the two 5% tails. Figure 6, in appendix, complements
Figure 1. It plots the impulse response function (IRF) at a five–year horizon and its centered
90% confidence interval obtained by standard bootstrap techniques, using 1000 draws from the
sample residuals.
Figure 1 shows that the short–run response of hours worked in all countries is negligible
negative. For all countries but Japan, the response of hours is persistently negative; and signif-
icantly so in five countries out of seven (Canada, UK, Germany, France and Italy). These first
empirical results are obtained from each of the major seven countries separately. The OECD
Statistics Directorate reports hours worked and output data for the entire G7.7 We redo the
previous exercise using these aggregate data instead of country–level data and we compute the
IRFs of hours worked. The last panel of Figure 1 display the the distribution of impact re-
sponses of hours worked to a permanent technology shock in the G7 aggregate. At this level of
aggregation, the response of hours worked is now positive (and persistently so, as shown in the
last panel of Figure 6).
The discrepancy between estimates at the country level and at the aggregate level is exempli-
fied by the implied response of hours for the G7 as a population–weighted sum of country–level
point estimates.8 This computed impact response is displayed (by squares) in the left panel of
7Hours worked and population numbers are simply the sums of country–level data. To compute aggregate GDP,
national accounts data are converted to US dollars using 1995 GDP purchasing power parities (PPPs) for constant
price data and current PPPs for data in current prices.
8Country–level point estimates are weighted according to the share of each country in total population because we
consider per capita productivity and hours worked.
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Figure 1: Impact response of hours worked to a country–level permanent productivity shock
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Note: These figures display the smoothed distribution of impact responses obtained by standard
bootstrap techniques, using 1000 draws from the sample residuals.
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Figure 2 together with the distribution estimated on aggregate data. The country–level based
impact response equals -0.368, while the impact response obtained at the aggregate level is
0.254. Hence, the impact response at the aggregate level differs sharply from the country–level
responses. Over time, left panel of Figure 7 shows that the weighted sum of point estimates
remains negative and outside the confidence interval.
Figure 2: Impact response of G7 hours implied by country–level experiments
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Note: This figure displays the impact response of G7 hours worked to technology improvement, as esti-
mated in a VAR
(
∆xG7,∆nG7
)
. The smoothed distribution of impact responses obtained by standard
bootstrap techniques, using 1000 draws from the sample residuals. On the left panel, squares symbol-
ize the weighted sum of hours worked response based on country–level VAR (∆xi,∆ni). On the right
panel, squares symbolize the weighted sum of hours worked response based on VAR
(
∆xG7,∆ni
)
.
Is a large discrepancy between these two quantitative evaluations of the aggregate effect of
a technology improvement really puzzling? If the seven major countries were hit by country–
specific permanent shocks which does not cointegrate, the answer is no. Too see why, consider
a world composed of two countries, A and B. Assume that labor productivity in A rises by
1%, triggering a 0.5% reduction in labor input. At the same time, country B experiences a
1% drop in labor productivity and a 1% increase in labor input. As soon as A is larger than
B, world average labor productivity increases. If A is very large relative to B (precisely, over
two–thirds of world population), world labor input falls. Below this threshold, world average
labor input increases. In the latter situation, the conditional correlation between world average
labor input and productivity is positive even though this conditional correlation is negative in
both countries. At the opposite, if there exists a permanent and common technology shock
for the major seven countries, the discrepancy is a puzzle. The common shock hypothesis can
be easily tested with actual data, since it implies that labor productivities of the major seven
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countries do cointegrate.
We perform cointegration tests over the seven country–level labor productivities using Jo-
hansen’s method. We estimate a Vector Error Correction Model with two lagged differences
of the explanatory variables and one error correction (lagged once) term. In this procedure,
variables are first demeaned.9 This specification implies that all upward trending in the data
has to be attributed to stochastic trends. A unique stochastic trend would receive the natural
interpretation of a world permanent shock. Johansen’s test statistics are reported in Table 2
(in appendix). We find that none of the test statistics leads to reject six long–run relationships
among the seven labor productivities. These tests favor the existence of a common stochastic
trend.10 The unique common trend in country–level labor productivities can be interpreted as
a permanent world technology shock. Our findings are in accordance with Rabanal et al. [2008].
They find that a proxy of TFP cointegrates one to one among major industrialized countries.11
3 Results from mixing aggregate and country data
Given the previous quantitative findings, we propose in this paper another SVAR specification to
assess the effect of a world technology shock. We replace each country–level labor productivity
by the aggregation of country–level labor productivities to offset country–specific persistent
shocks and eliminate these sources of contamination. Although imperfect in the very short–
run, the observed labor productivity of the G7 zone, denoted xG7t , is a promising and available
candidate in the VAR model (1). The variable ∆xt in equation (1) is now replaced by ∆xG7t .
Figure 3 reports the empirical distributions of the impact response of hours (while the
dynamic responses appear in Figure 8, in appendix). For each country, it displays two smoothed
distributions of impact responses. The light grey one refers to VAR
(
∆xi,∆ni
)
, as in Figure 1.
The medium grey one refers to VAR
(
∆xG7,∆ni
)
.
Figure 3 shows that the distributions of impact responses move on the right for each country
but Japan. These new estimations differ significantly from those obtained with country–level
data for Canada, UK, France and Italy. Contrary to the results at the country level, these
estimates suggest two groups of countries regarding the impact of technology improvements on
9We also perform cointegration tests without any prefiltering of the data and find very similar results. With the
latter procedure, we include an intercept in the cointegration equation but none in the VAR.
10The country–level labor productivities used in these cointegration tests are expressed in units of local currency at
constant price (basically, in units of local good). Hence, they might not be comparable from one country to the other in
the short–run. To investigate this issue, we redo the cointegration tests using purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted
labor productivities. The results are identical. Throughout the rest of the paper, we have checked the sensitivity of
our results to PPP–adjustment. They remain unchanged.
11Due to data availability, their international TFP measures are obtained from the labor input only.
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Figure 3: Impact response of hours worked to an aggregate–level permanent productivity shock
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Note: These figures display two smoothed distributions of impact responses obtained by standard
bootstrap techniques, using 1000 draws from the sample residuals: the light grey one refers to VAR
(∆xi,∆ni), as in Figure 1; the medium grey one refers to VAR
(
∆xG7,∆ni
)
.
10
hours worked. Continental European countries exhibit tiny adjustments in labor input, while
US, Canada and UK display positive (and persistent, as can be seen in Figure 8) responses of
hours worked.
To assess the estimates of IRFs based on aggregate–level productivity, we compute the
implied response for the G7 as a population-weighted sum of country-level point estimates.
This computed impact response is displayed by squares in the right panel of Figure 2 together
with the distribution of impact responses estimated on aggregate data. The two estimates are
indistinguishable, and remain so at longer horizons (see the right panel of Figure 7).
The use of aggregate–level labor productivity and country–level hours worked therefore solves
the aggregation anomaly. Our interpretation is that country–level productivities are highly
contaminated measures of aggregate technology in the short run. Therefore, SVAR models that
use country–level labor productivity data deliver biased estimates of the response of hours to
technology shocks. On the contrary, aggregate–level labor productivity in SVAR models can
eliminate the distortions due to country–specific persistent shocks. This view counters the usual
intuition that useful information is lost through aggregation.
4 Larger SVAR models
We now assess the robustness of the empirical findings of Section 3 by considering larger SVAR
models.
First, we augment the specification with an additional variable, the difference between the
country–level labor productivity and the G7 aggregate labor productivity. Johansen’s test
statistics (in Table 2) suggest that a single stochastic trend hits permanently the seven country–
level labor productivities. As in the previous section, we use in (1) the G7 labor productivity
to measure this shock. The difference xit − xG7t (i = 1, ..., 7) can thus help to capture highly
persistent, if not permanent, components in country–level labor productivities. The results of
this experiment are reported in Figure 4 (again, the dynamic responses appear in Figure 9,
in appendix). For each country, it displays two smoothed distributions of impact responses:
the light grey one refers to VAR
(
∆xi,∆ni
)
, as in Figure 1; the medium grey one refers to
VAR
(
∆xG7,∆ni, xi − xG7). Once again, the distribution of impact response shifts right for all
countries but Japan. Indeed, the response of hours in US, Japan and UK in the three-variables
VAR are very similar to those obtained with the two-variables VAR while the discrepancy
between the results of the two VAR models in Canada, Germany, France and Italy suggest that
these countries have a persistent country–specific component in labor productivity. Figure 9
11
displays the impulse response functions at longer horizons.
Second, we include in the SVAR the seven country–level labor inputs. The specification(
∆xG7t ,∆n
1
t , . . . ,∆n
7
t
)
can potentially account for the international transmission of shocks in
a multi–country setup.12 The estimated impact responses are displayed in Figure 5 and the
estimated dynamic responses in Figure 10, in appendix.
The results established in the two–variables VAR are preserved in this eight–variables VAR:
the short–run response of hours worked to global permanent technology improvements by and
large exceeds the response estimated using country–level data..
5 Concluding remarks
This paper belongs to the large literature evaluating the empirical effects of technology shocks
on labor input using VAR models. The aim of this literature is to establish a robust stylized
fact which would discriminate between competing business cycle models.
When SVAR models are estimated with country–level data, we obtain that hours worked
persistently decrease in most of countries, whereas they persistently increase with aggregate–
level data. We suggest to replace the country–level productivity by a cross–country aggregate.
Using aggregate–level data, the response of the labor input shift up in most of countries as
compared to our initial estimates. The use of an aggregate measure of the labor productivity
solves the conflicting results obtained from country–level data.
The analysis undertaken in this paper emphasizes the international transmission of shocks.
We believe that the empirical quest for the forces driving the business cycle should take into
account such external shocks on top of domestic factors.
12Given the size of our sample, we cannot estimate the 31 parameters of a two lag VAR including both productivity
differentials and labor inputs for all countries.
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Figure 4: Impact response of hours worked to an aggregate–level permanent productivity shock in
larger VARs – Productivity differentials
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Note: These figures display two smoothed distributions of impact responses obtained by standard
bootstrap techniques, using 1000 draws from the sample residuals: the light grey one refers to VAR
(∆xi,∆ni), as in Figure 1; the medium grey one refers to VAR
(
∆xG7,∆ni, xi − xG7).
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Figure 5: Impact response of hours worked to an aggregate–level permanent productivity shock in
larger VARs – Seven countries’ labor inputs
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Note: These figures display two smoothed distributions of impact responses obtained by standard
bootstrap techniques, using 1000 draws from the sample residuals: the light grey one refers to VAR(
∆xG7,∆ni
)
, as in Figure 3; the medium grey one refers to VAR
(
∆xG7,∆ni,∆n−i
)
.
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Appendix
Table 1: ADF unit root tests on hours worked
critical values
country hours worked 1% 5% 10%
United States -1.181 -3.640 -2.946 -2.616
Canada -1.008 -3.640 -2.946 -2.616
Japan 0.126 -3.640 -2.946 -2.616
United-Kingdom -1.605 -3.640 -2.946 -2.616
Germany -1.461 -3.640 -2.946 -2.616
France -1.845 -3.640 -2.946 -2.616
Italy -1.348 -3.640 -2.946 -2.616
G7 -1.479 -3.640 -2.946 -2.616
Note: ADF t-statistics for the null hypothesis of a unit root in the log-level of each time series, based
on an ADF test with 2 lags and an intercept. Sample period 1972–2004.
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Table 2: Johansen cointegration tests of labor productivity
critical values
H0 trace stat. 1% 5% 10%
r ≤ 0 320.327 120.367 125.619 135.982
r ≤ 1 180.787 91.109 95.754 104.964
r ≤ 2 114.366 65.820 69.819 77.820
r ≤ 3 66.717 44.493 47.855 54.682
r ≤ 4 34.999 27.067 29.796 35.463
r ≤ 5 15.485 13.429 15.494 19.935
r ≤ 6 0.005 2.705 3.841 6.635
critical values
H0 eigenvalue stat. 1% 5% 10%
r ≤ 0 139.540 43.295 46.230 52.307
r ≤ 1 66.421 37.279 40.076 45.866
r ≤ 2 47.649 31.238 33.878 39.369
r ≤ 3 31.718 25.124 27.586 32.717
r ≤ 4 19.514 18.893 21.131 25.865
r ≤ 5 15.480 12.297 14.264 18.520
r ≤ 6 0.005 2.705 3.841 6.635
Note: Johansen cointegration tests with 2 lags on demeaned variables. Sample period 1972–2004.
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Figure 6: IRFs of hours worked to a country–level permanent productivity shock
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Note: These figures display the impulse response function of hours worked to a permanent produc-
tivity shock in a VAR (∆xi,∆ni) and its 90% confidence interval.
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Figure 7: IRFs of G7 hours implied by aggregate–level experiments
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Note:
This figure displays the impulse response function of hours worked to a permanent productivity shock
in a VAR
(
∆xG7,∆nG7
)
and its 90% confidence interval. On the left panel, squares symbolize the
weighted sum of hours worked response based on country–level VAR (∆xi,∆ni). On the right panel,
squares symbolize the weighted sum of hours worked response based on VAR
(
∆xG7,∆ni
)
.
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Figure 8: IRFs of hours worked to an aggregate–level permanent productivity shock
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Note: These figures display the impulse response function of hours worked to a permanent produc-
tivity shock in a VAR
(
∆xG7,∆ni
)
and its 90% confidence interval, as well as the point estimate
impulse response of Figure 6.
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Figure 9: IRFs of hours worked to an aggregate–level permanent productivity shock in larger VARs –
Productivity differentials
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Note: These figures display the impulse response function of hours worked to a permanent produc-
tivity shock in a VAR
(
∆xG7,∆ni, xi − xG7) (thick grey line), as well as the point estimate impulse
response of Figure 8 and its 90% confidence interval.
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Figure 10: IRFs of hours worked to an aggregate–level permanent productivity shock in larger VARs –
Seven countries’ labor inputs
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Note: These figures display the impulse response function of hours worked to a permanent produc-
tivity shock in a VAR
(
∆xG7,∆ni,∆n−i
)
(thick grey line), as well as the point estimate impulse
response of Figure 8 and its 90% confidence interval.
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